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ABSTRACT 
 
REBECCA BEST: Negotiation in the Shadow of an Extremist Threat 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
 
In this paper I model negotiations between a state and the moderate faction of a 
terrorist organization first with complete information and later with this assumption 
dropped.  The goal of this exercise is to reach a more complete understanding of what can 
be expected from such negotiations.  The results of the model indicate that under certain 
circumstances, when moderates agree to cooperate with the state, extremists may attack 
the moderates of their own organization.  This provides an explanation for the elevated 
levels of terrorist violence that accompany state negotiations with terrorists.  The model 
also suggests that, under certain circumstances, the moderate faction may initiate 
negotiations with the state to push the extremists into offering concessions (which might 
include, among other things, a greater role in the decision making of the group or public 
services such as schools and infrastructure) to the moderates.      
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Introduction 
 The leaders of state targets of terrorism frequently deny negotiating with terrorists.  
Many leaders insist that they will not negotiate with terrorists as doing so would serve to 
legitimate terrorist tactics.  When lives hang in the balance, state leaders are torn between 
standing firm against terrorism and negotiating to save the lives of civilians.  Despite 
assertions to the contrary, many states have negotiated with terrorists, some with more 
success than others. 
 As states and terrorists attempt to negotiate, the level of violence frequently 
increases.  This violence often occurs between the terrorists and the state; however 
violence may also occur within the terrorist organization.  This latter intra-organizational 
violence has been under studied within the literature.  The present work demonstrates that 
this type of violence, even the mere threat of this sort violence, can be critical in 
determining whether negotiations between terrorists and the state will be successful and 
what sorts of government policies will hold the most promise for the establishment of 
peace.   
  Currently, American attempts to reach a lasting peace with Iraqi citizens are 
being undercut by extremist threats aimed at those who participate in negotiations or 
support peace efforts.  Al-Qaeda operatives have been known to assassinate Sunni leaders 
active in peace talks and the new Iraqi government.  This example is discussed in more 
detail later in this paper, and the model itself provides a first cut at examining the effect 
of this inter-factional violence on the prospects for peace.  
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Negotiating with terrorists may also pose significant audience costs for leaders 
who wish to appear strong on national security issues, especially if those negotiations are 
unsuccessful.  Given the potential high costs to negotiating, leaders will want to avoid 
doing so when they do not anticipate success.  This project explores what leaders can 
expect from negotiations and provides a starting point for research into a new 
understanding of the needs and position of moderates willing to abandon terrorist tactics 
for peace.  Such an understanding should lead to more effective counter-terror policies 
designed to appeal to moderates facing different types of extremist threats and offers. 
 The models I present here indicate that terrorist violence may increase during 
periods of negotiation as the extremists within the terrorist organization use violence 
directed at the moderates within their group to prevent those moderates from proceeding 
with the negotiations.  I distinguish between moderates and extremists by assuming that 
there is some level of state concessions that would deter the moderates from terrorism 
while the state cannot deter extremists.   
The model with incomplete information generates another interesting finding.  
When the extremists are uncertain of the value that the moderates place on a victory 
against the government from within the organization, they may prefer to make a 
nonviolent offer of concession (such as a greater role in decision making within the 
group).  Some types of moderates that prefer to remain within the organization will have 
an incentive to pretend that they have a lower value for remaining in the terrorist 
organization in order to gain concessions from the extremists that they would not 
otherwise receive.  In this equilibrium, by pooling with types that have a lower value for 
staying within the terrorist group some types of moderates are able to play the state 
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against the extremists to gain more from the extremists.  This equilibrium is one example 
of the concept Richardson (2006) developed of “devious objectives” which he defines as 
“any involvement in a mediation or peacemaking process on the part of a disputant that is 
not committed to compromise” (63).  Such devious objectives may lead actors to join or 
initiate a peace process not for peace but for other benefits that may come with 
involvement in the process. Richardson notes that devious objectives may be the result of 
trade-offs between factions of a group, but he does not explore this possibility and its 
implications. 
  
 
 
Previous Work 
 Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, work in this field has become more common, 
and there are several existing formal models of negotiation between terrorist actors and 
states.  In one of the first of these models, Kydd and Walter (2002) disaggregate the 
opposition group into two components, moderates and extremists.  They model an 
interaction in which the moderates, having struck a peace agreement with the government, 
decide whether to attempt to suppress the violent extremists in accordance with the deal.  
They find that the extremists may try to resist the moderates’ attempts at suppression in 
order to convince the state that the moderates are either not credible or not capable of 
controlling the extremists, thereby leading to the unraveling of the peace agreement.  
Kydd and Walter propose that it is this type of spoiler violence directed at government-
friendly targets that makes extremists so successful at ending peace processes.   
 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2005) presents an alternative model of negotiations 
between the state and opposition moderates that is, like Kydd’s and Walter’s, consistent 
with an increase in violence at the time of negotiations.  Like Kydd and Walter, Bueno de 
Mesquita models the opposition as consisting of a moderate faction and an extremist 
faction, but he diverges from them in that he models the decision making process within 
the opposition before negotiations and after talks have commenced.  He assumes that ex 
ante the moderates constrain the extremists, thereby holding the violence at a level lower 
than that the extremists would prefer, and that once the moderates accept an offer to 
negotiate with the government they are no longer able to constrain the extremists leading 
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to a prolonged increase in extremist violence.  Whereas Kydd and Walter predict a short 
term spike in violence immediately preceding and accompanying negotiations, Bueno de 
Mesquita predicts a long term increase in the level of terrorist violence following the 
initiation of negotiation.  Bueno de Mesquita further concludes that, despite this increase 
in the intensity of violence, states negotiate with terrorists because they hope the 
counterterrorism aid the moderates can provide will lead to a shorter, if more violent, war.   
 Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson (2007) also model interaction between the 
moderate and extremist factions of an opposition force and the state.  Here the extremist 
faction may attack the state in order to provoke repression or a counterattack from the 
government that will mobilize the opposition support base in favor of the extremists 
rather than the moderates.  In this model the extremists are, in a sense, battling both the 
state and their own moderates.   
 Bueno de Mesquita’s (2008) 1 model of factions within terrorist organizations 
assumes “two possible sources of tension between factions: ideological divergence and 
competition for contested adherents” which are interconnected in that “avoiding one of 
these two types of conflict comes at the price of exacerbating the other” (28).  This trade 
off exists because as factions move closer to each other ideologically (thereby mitigating 
the problem of ideological divergence), they begin to compete for more of the same 
potential adherents because the difference between the distances of each faction and any 
potential adherent is reduced.  On the other hand an ideological shift by one faction to 
either extreme reduces the number of contested adherents while increasing the potential 
                                                 
1
 This is the same paper that Bueno de Mesquita presented at the 2008 ISA conference under the title 
"Terrorist Factions and Internecine Violence" (email from Ethan Bueno de Mesquita), but in the References 
section of this paper it is listed as “Terrorist Factions” because this is the title under which it is available on 
the author’s website.  
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for ideologically driven conflict.  Bueno de Mesquita further notes that one faction may 
use violence to deter defection to the other faction.   Bueno de Mesquita does not address 
the effect of violence between factions on the negotiation process, only on recruitment to 
splinter groups and the competition for adherents. 
 Modeling the terrorist organization as a unitary actor Navin Bapat (2006) 
considers the credibility problem facing terrorists attempting to negotiate with the state.  
Bapat finds that the credibility problem that normally inhibits successful negotiations 
with terrorists may be overcome when the terrorists have a host state “with the ability to 
monitor and impose moderate costs on the terrorist groups” (213).  Bapat argues that for 
success the costs must be moderate because if they are too lenient the terrorists have little 
incentive to comply and if the costs are too severe the terrorists may avoid negotiation 
altogether.  Bapat’s assertion of the necessity of a commitment mechanism to ensure 
peace supports Bueno de Mesquita’s (2005) argument that both the extremists and the 
moderates within a group will not simultaneously lay down arms to negotiate because 
doing so would allow the government to renege on any agreement with minimized fear of 
retribution from the opposition.  Whereas Bueno de Mesquita is interested in a 
mechanism to prevent the government from taking advantage of the opposition, Bapat’s 
host state would provide a commitment mechanism to increase the credibility of the 
opposition. 
 Arce and Sandler (2007) model the state’s choice between making concessions 
and standing firm against terrorist violence when the government is uncertain of the 
terrorists’ willingness to continue violent attacks.  They find that the government’s lack 
of information regarding the level of extremism of the terrorists (or whether the moderate 
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or extremist faction of the organization is strongest) may lead the government to either 
make concessions to a group that would not continue violent attacks regardless of the 
concessions or to resist a group that will engage in more costly attacks against 
government-friendly targets as a result of the state’s resistance.   
 Stedman (1997) is an early non-formal work on spoiler behavior within 
negotiations.  Stedman identifies spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace 
emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use 
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (5).  Stedman goes on to distinguish 
between inside and outside spoilers—that is between spoilers who have indicated a 
willingness to participate in the negotiations and those who have been excluded from the 
peace process.  Stedman’s definition of outside spoilers includes those who attack 
government friendly targets (consistent with Kydd and Walter’s analysis) as well as those 
who attack members of the opposition interested in negotiating with the government 
(consistent with my analysis).  The model presented here produces two types of spoiling 
equilibria.  In the first of these extremists, Stedman’s outside spoilers, use violent threats 
to deter the moderates from concluding a peace agreement with the government.  In the 
other, moderates initiate negotiations with the government in order to gain concessions 
from the extremists.  This second equilibrium builds on Stedman’s concept of inside 
spoilers by stipulating a particular motivation for the spoiling behavior.   
 Like Kydd and Walter, Bueno de Mesquita, and Bueno de Mesquita and Ericson, 
I disaggregate the opposition into an extremist and a moderate faction.  Although a few of 
my assumptions differ from those made by these authors, the primary way in which my 
analysis departs from theirs’ is that it models the extremists’ response to negotiations 
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between the state and the opposition moderates as a phenomenon targeting the moderates 
rather than the state.  My model is not incompatible with these other models any more 
than they are incompatible with each other, but it does provide an additional explanation 
for increased violence at the time of negotiations between the state and the opposition 
moderates. 
 My model is complementary to Bapat’s in that I am modeling an interaction that 
should require some form of commitment mechanism for both sides.  For the state, I 
assume, following Bueno de Mesquita, that the fact that the extremists are still engaged in 
terrorist activity will keep the government somewhat credible to the moderates.  Short of 
the state sponsor that can observe and punish violation that Bapat models, there is little in 
the way of a commitment mechanism for the moderates.  Although the state could simply 
persecute the moderates who have come forward to negotiate, the extremists in the field 
might punish the state for such behavior.  My model assumes that all offers of 
concessions and threats of punishment are credible.  How this credibility is achieved on 
the terrorist side may vary, however I assume that the extremists’ nonviolent offer to the 
moderates is credible because the moderates would be able to return to negotiations with 
the state at any time (of course this may or may not be true depending on the ability and 
willingness of the government to reopen negotiations).  I further assume that the 
extremists’ violent threat is credible because the extremists are concerned about their 
reputation.  
Arce’s and Sandler’s model is similar to my own in that it models the 
government’s choice between making concessions (analogous to making an offer to 
negotiate in my model) and engaging in counterterrorism (analogous to the status quo of 
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continued attacks in my model).  My model differs from theirs in that I am primarily 
concerned with the interaction that occurs between the moderate and extremist factions 
after an offer has been made.  The interaction between the factions of the opposition is of 
greater importance to me than the interaction between the opposition as a whole and the 
state.
  
 
 
A Game Theoretic Model of Negotiation with Terrorist Moderates 
Actors: 
To model negotiation between a state and terrorists I disaggregate the terrorist 
organization into two factions: a moderate faction and an extremist faction, distinguished 
by their amenability to concessions from the government.  I consider the extremists to be 
that faction of a group that will accept nothing less than the complete destruction of the 
state while the moderates are that faction of the organization for which there exists some 
offer from the state that would persuade it to lay down arms and cooperate with the state.  
There are three readily conceivable reasons that one faction within a terrorist organization 
might be more willing to negotiate than another.   
Chai (1993) and others argue that a prolonged history of violence may lead to a 
problem of adverse selection—that is new members may join because of the tactics rather 
than the goals of the group (also May 1974; Wardlaw 1989; Post 1998).  The danger of 
adverse is selection is that it could lead to a split within the group between those who 
remain committed to the group’s original goals and those who simply enjoy violence.  
Smith (2008) suggests a related reason that terrorist organizations may be divided 
between those who are amenable to negotiation and those who are uncompromising.  
Smith argues that terrorists may gain a sense of purpose and even power from 
involvement in the terrorist organization as well engagement in terrorist acts (see also 
Post 1998).  He writes that it is not only the violent tactics of terrorist organizations that 
may attract non-politically motivated actors, but also the opportunity to be a part of the 
 11 
terrorist community, even to become a leader (also Post 1998; Reich 1998).  From this 
perspective, the extremist’s identity is so tightly bound to the organization or she is 
receiving material or psychological benefits of membership such that she is more 
concerned with prolonging the organization’s existence than with achieving its stated 
goals.  The third, and perhaps most obvious, reason that one faction may be less open to 
compromise and negotiation with the state is varying degrees of ideological intensity 
among factions within the broader organization.  The intensity of the extremists’ position 
may lessen the divisibility of the issue at stake for them—that is where the extremists 
might be willing to compromise in certain less fundamental areas, the extremists will 
have fewer such areas.  For the extremists the battle is an all or nothing affair. 
For simplicity I, like Kydd and Walter, Bueno de Mesquita, and Bueno de 
Mesquita and Ericson, model the state as a unitary actor.  It would be reasonable to 
consider the state as a collective actor composed of two or more factions, however it is 
the terrorists’ response to the state, rather than the decision making process within the 
state, that is the primary concern of this endeavor.  Future research might disaggregate 
the state to determine if and how the existence of multiple factions within the state 
changes the basic model presented here.  The model thus consists of three actors: the state 
(S), the extremists (E) and the moderates (M).   
Sequence of Play: 
The game proceeds in the following way: the state decides whether to make an 
offer σ to the moderates.  If the state does not offer σ, the game ends.  If the state does 
offer σ, the moderates may choose to accept (A) or not accept (~A) the offer.  If the 
moderates do not accept the offer, the game ends.  If the moderates do accept the offer, 
 12 
the extremists may choose whether to respond with violence (V) or not (~V).  If the 
extremists choose not to use violence they will make a nonviolent offer to the moderates 
that (by assumption) may range from 0 to some positive upper bound (determined by 
available resources and incentives to regain the moderates’ support).  After the extremists 
have chosen their response, the moderates make a final decision between the extremists 
and the state.   
Assumptions: 
 In order to solve this game it is necessary to make several assumptions.  The set 
of assumptions I have made is not the only feasible set, nor is it necessarily the set most 
reflective of reality.  Later I will address the implications of my assumptions and the 
extent to which they do reflect reality as well as some of the alternative assumptions that 
could be used to evaluate the game.   
 I begin by making the fairly standard assumption of complete information.  
Although it is unlikely that the state will have a perfect understanding of all of the 
extremists plans, capabilities, and preferences, it does seem likely that after prolonged 
battle between the two sides, the state will have some reasonable understanding of these 
aspects of its opponent.   
 I further assume that all offers and threats are credible.  The state’s offer to the 
moderates is assumed credible because with the extremists still fighting, the moderates 
will be able to return to the fray at any time if they judge the state to be in noncompliance 
with the deal it has struck with the moderates (Bueno de Mesquita 2005).  The 
extremists’ nonviolent offer is assumed credible because the moderates are assumed to 
have the ability to return to negotiations with the state at any point.  Threats of violence 
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from the extremists are assumed credible because the game models only a short period 
within a much longer relationship between the three actors and the credibility of the 
extremists in future periods is at stake if the extremist faction does not follow through on 
its threats.  Although the extremists receive lower utility for following through on a threat 
of violence once the moderates have sided with the state, the extremists will follow 
through with the threat to preserve their reputation because they anticipate future 
interactions with the other two players.  Similarly, I assume that if the Extremists make a 
nonviolent offer they will not attack the moderates even if the moderates choose the state.  
Conversely, because in the status quo the state is fighting the entire terrorist organization, 
I assume that if the moderates choose the extremists they will face continuing attacks 
from the state. 
 I next assume that there is no cost for offers that are not accepted.  One 
justification for this assumption is that states, preferring not to be caught negotiating with 
terrorists, may keep the negotiations secret.  If the negotiations are not secret, there may 
indeed be audience costs to the negotiations; further, there may be minor costs associated 
with time, resources, and personnel devoted to the negotiations.  The extremists are also 
assumed to pay no cost for nonviolent offers that are not accepted or violent threats that 
successfully return the moderates to the extremists (that is the threat is ‘not accepted’ and 
the moderates return to the terrorist organization).  Later I will discuss the possible 
implications of changing this assumption with regard to threats of violence.  
 With regard to the value of the extremists’ offer to the moderates, I assume that 
nonviolent offers do not have to be sufficient to lure the moderates away from the state in 
order for the extremists to make them.  Such offers may therefore range from zero (do 
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nothing) to some upper bound determined by resources and motivation, but are 
exogenously set.  With regard to the offer from the state, I assume that the only condition 
on the offer is that the moderates cease fighting the state and supporting the extremists.  
This assumption differs from other work on the subject that assumes the moderates must 
provide counter-terrorism assistance to the state in exchange for the state’s offer (Kydd 
and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005).   
 My final assumption is that the moderates cannot “play both sides.”  In the final 
stage of the game the moderates must choose between the state and the extremists; there 
is no middle ground and no double cross option.  Double cross might be possible in 
reality, but it would be a very risky option, especially for a moderate wing that is bound 
to the same geographic area as the extremists and the state (both of whom would be 
expected to attack upon discovering betrayal). 
Payoffs:  
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the negotiation game I describe with payoffs listed 
first for the moderates, second the extremists, and last for the state.  The status quo 
outcome may be achieved in three ways: when the state does not make an offer, the 
moderates reject the offer, or the moderates accept the offer but succumb to the 
extremists’ violent threat.  For the moderates this outcome produces the product of the 
probability, p, with which the moderates and extremists will be successful against the 
state and the value, Vm, to the moderates of that victory.  The payoff to the extremists is 
similar, the product of the probability, p, of success and the value, Ve, of that success to 
the extremists.  The state’s utility is the product of its probability of success, 1-p, and its 
value, Vs, for success.   
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 When the moderates accept the state’s offer, σ, and the extremists counter with a 
threat of violence that the moderates in turn reject, the moderates receive the value, S, of 
the state’s offer minus the cost, α, of the attacks the moderates must endure from the 
extremists.  The extremists receive the probability q that they are successful against the 
state without the moderates multiplied by their value for success (which I assume to be 
the same whether they fight with or without the moderates). The state receives the 
Figure 1: The Negotiation Game 
 difference of the probability, 1-q, that it is successful in fighting the extremists only 
multiplied by its value for victory minus the cost of its offer to the moderates (where ~ 
over the c represents the increased cost of σ resulting from the extremist violence against 
the moderates.  This increase may be the result of efforts to protect the moderates, the 
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increased risk of delivering goods or services to a population under attack, or a 
combination of the above).   
 If the extremists chose to make a nonviolent counteroffer (which may range from 
0, equivalent to a promise not to attack, to offers of goods, services, money, or influence) 
and the moderates reject this offer, the moderates receive the value of the offer from the 
state, the extremists receive the value for victory discounted by the probability q that they 
are successful without the moderates, and the state receives the probability of a state 
victory weighted by the value of victory to the state less the cost of the nonviolent offer.  
If the moderates accept the extremists’ nonviolent offer they receive the value of that 
offer plus the value of their status quo payoff, the extremists receive their status quo 
minus the cost of the nonviolent offer, and the state receives its status quo payoff.
  
  
 
Results and Interpretation 
 As is standard, I use backward induction to solve the game.  I begin by evaluating 
M’s decision between the state and the extremists at stage four of the game.  At the 
history {σ, A, ~V}, M will choose the state if S > N + pVm, and at the history { σ, A, V}, 
M will choose the state if S > pVm + α.  M’s strategy is then determined in part by the 
relationship between the value of the offer from the state (S), the value of the nonviolent 
offer from the extremists (N), and the cost of attacks from the extremists (α).  The actions 
of the state, the extremists, and the moderates in stage two will all hinge on this M 
relationship.   
 If N > α (i.e. N + pVm > α + pVm), the moderates will always choose the 
extremists if N + pVm > α + pVm > S (call this case 1); if N + pVm > S > α + pVm (case 
2), the moderates will choose the extremists when they are nonviolent and the state when 
the extremists are violent; if S > N + pVm > α + pVm (case 3), the moderates will always 
choose the state in stage four. The extremists’ course of action at stage three will then be 
determined by what it expects the moderates to do in stage three. In case 1, the extremists 
will always choose violence because pVe > pVe - cn is always true.  In case two, E will 
choose nonviolence if pVe - cn > qVe - cv and violence if qVe - cv > pVe - cn.  Because 
p is the probability that the moderates and the extremists are successful together whereas 
q is the probability that the extremists operating alone are successful, it is reasonable to 
assume that p > q is always true.  It follows that the extremists will only choose violence 
when the cost of violence is sufficiently low and/or the cost of nonviolence is sufficiently 
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high to counteract the difference in the probabilities p and q.  In case 3, E will always 
choose nonviolence because qVe > qVe – cv is always true. 
  Figure 2: Equilibria under the condition N > α 
 We can next proceed to evaluate M’s choices in stage 2, still assuming that N > α.  
In case 1 where M will always side with the extremists in the final stage and the 
extremists will always use violence, the moderates at stage 2 will never accept the state’s 
offer because pVm, the payoff that would result from accepting the offer, is never greater 
than pVm, the payoff from not accepting.2  In case 2, if pVe – cn > qVe- cv (meaning the 
extremists will choose nonviolence; I will call this condition 1), the moderates will 
always accept the state’s offer because N + pVm > pVm.  If the reverse condition is true 
and the extremists will always choose violence (condition 2), the moderates will accept 
the state’s offer if S > pVm + α, which is one of the defining conditions for case two and 
is therefore always true under these circumstances.  In case 3, M chooses to accept if S > 
pVm, which is always true since in this case S > N +pVm.   
 Finally in stage one, I evaluate the state’s decision to make (or not make) an offer 
to the extremists based on the strategies of the other players.  In case 1, the strategy pair 
for M and E is (~AE, V).  Given this, if the state chooses to make an offer it will receive 
the payoff (1-p)*Vs and if S chooses not to make an offer it will receive (1-p)*Vs.  I 
                                                 
2
 I assume that because the moderates gain nothing from accepting the state’s offer they will choose to take 
the earlier pVm payoff.  This assumption is reasonable for that reason and because in reality the moderates 
might risk angering the extremists and reducing their own credibility with both the state and the extremists.  
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assume that S will only make an offer if the payoff of doing so is greater than not doing 
so3, therefore I anticipate that S will never make an offer in case 1.  In case 2, under 
condition 1, M and E will play the strategy pair (AE, ~V), and S will therefore receive (1-
p)*Vs if it makes an offer and the same if it does not.  S should not make an offer in this 
situation. In case 2, condition 2, M and E will play the strategy pair (AS, V), and S will 
receive the payoff if it makes an offer; S will make an offer if this value 
is greater than (1-p)*Vs.  Because p > q is always true, 1-q must be greater than 1-p, and 
S will make the offer if the cost of doing so given that the E will choose violence is not so 
great as to entirely counteract the advantage of the increased probability of wining.  In 
case 3, M and E will play strategy pair (AS, ~V) and the state will make offer σ if (1-
q)*Vs - c σ > (1-p)*Vs.  The above condition will be met when the pVs – qVs > c σ, that 
is when the cost of the offer is less than the increase in the probability that the state is 
successful gained through the elimination of the moderates from the opposition.   
 Alternatively, if α > N (i.e. α + pVm > N + pVm), the moderates will always 
choose the extremists if S < N + pVm < α + pVm (case 1).  If N + pVm < S < α + pVm 
(case 2), the moderates will choose the state if the extremists are nonviolent and the 
extremists if E is violent.  If N + pVm < α + pVm < S (case 3), the moderates will always 
choose the state.  In case 1 the extremists will always choose violence because pVe > 
pVe-cn is always true.  In case 2 the extremists always choose violence because pVe > 
qVe is always true given that p > q is true.  In case 3 the extremists never choose violence 
because qVe > qVe – cv is always true.   
                                                 
3
 Although I assume that there is no cost associated with making an offer that is rejected, any break with the 
status quo (such as an offer) should require a positive incentive.   
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  Figure 3: Equilibria under the condition α > N 
 In stage 2 the moderates will always choose to accept the state’s offer in case 1.  
In case 2 the moderates reject the state’s offer because pVm is not greater than pVm.  In 
case 3 the moderates always accept the state’s offer because S > pVm is always true in 
this case.   
 Once again the state decides whether to make an offer based on its expectations 
regarding the actions of the moderates and the extremists.  In case 1 the strategy pair for 
the M and E is (~AE, V).  Based on this, the state will not make an offer because the 
payoff for making an offer is the same as that for not making an offer.  In case 2 the 
strategy pair is the same as that of case 1 and again the state never makes an offer.  In 
case M and E play the strategy pair (AS, ~V) and the state will make an offer if (1-q)*Vs 
- c σ > (1-p)*Vs.   
 This exercise produces two possible equilibria, characterized by the terminal 
histories { σ, A, V, S} and { σ, A, ~V, S}, in which the state makes an offer that the 
moderates then accept.4  These equilibria are only possible when the state makes an offer 
that is more valuable to the moderates than either α + pVm or N + pVm. When the 
extremists are more threatening towards the moderates (i.e. α > N), the state’s offer must 
be higher than when the extremists are less threatening.  The results do indicate an 
                                                 
4
 Note that the equilibrium characterized by the history { σ, A, ~V, S} Pareto dominates the equilibrium 
characterized by { σ, A, V, S}. 
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additional explanation for the spike in extremist violence that has been observed to 
accompany negotiations between the state and terrorist moderates.  According to this 
model, extremist violence during or after negotiations may be directed at the moderate 
wing of the terrorist organization rather than at the state as the explanations supplied by 
Bueno de Mesquita and Kydd and Walter have suggested.  This explanation of extremist 
violence is not incompatible with either of the aforementioned explanations; rather it 
provides an additional explanation.   
As with all game theoretic models, the results of my model are heavily dependent 
on my assumptions and on the structure of the game as I have designed it.  In the next 
chapter I discuss the effects of relaxing some of these [not always realistic] assumptions 
and make slight changes to the game structure.
  
 
 
Implications and Extensions 
 In its basic form, the game I have designed predicts that that all offers made will 
be accepted and that the moderates will not return to the extremists after accepting an 
offer from the state.  While the basic game does provide an interesting and useful 
explanation of increased violence that frequently accompanies negotiations between an 
opposition movement and the state, there is still much work to be done to bring the model 
more in line with reality.  Empirically we know that negotiations, once begun, are not 
always successful, but the model thus far does not reflect this.  In this section I examine 
the effects of changing certain assumptions and consider the effects of altering the 
structure of the game. 
 The assumption that rejected offers (or threats that need not be acted upon) are 
costless is not as important to the results as it might be given that I have required that the 
utility to the state of making an offer be strictly greater than the utility of the status quo 
and the basic model has not produced equilibria in which state offers are rejected at either 
the second or the fourth stage.  While it would not be a stretch to imagine that there might 
be audience costs or administrative or diplomatic costs for a state that makes an offer that 
is ultimately rejected, such costs do not affect the results of this model.   
The related assumption that extremist threats are only costly when they are 
insufficient to deter the moderates from siding with the state is more problematic.  In 
reality we might suspect that extremist threats are more likely to come in the form of low-
level violence than in words alone.  Dropping the assumption that threats are costless if 
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they are effective and assuming that threats include some show of force at the time they 
are made adds a cost to both the extremists and the moderates when the extremists use 
violence.  Adding a cost δcv (where δ is an arbitrarily small number between 0 and 1) to 
E’s payoff when it makes an effective violent threat and a cost δα to M’s payoff at the 
same outcome does not alter the terminal histories that produce equilibria, but it does 
loosen the conditions necessary to reach the nonviolent equilibria with terminal history 
{σ, A, ~V, S}.  When violent threats are costly the nonviolent equilibria can result in 
either of the following ways, rather than in only one way as in the basic model: 
1. N + pVm < S < α – δα + pVm (where M chooses the state if E is nonviolent 
and S > N + pVm and M chooses the state if E is violent and S > α – δα + 
pVm) and qVe > pVe – δcv and (1-q)*Vs – cσ > (1-p)*Vs. 
2. α – δα + pVm < N + pVm < S and (1-q)*Vs – cσ > (1-p)*Vs. 
 
In the basic model the assumption that the cost and value of the extremists’ 
nonviolent offer to the moderates is exogenously set produces the subgame imperfect 
equilibrium in which the extremists make a threat that is insufficient to deter the 
moderates from cooperation with the state because it is less costly to make the violent 
threat than to make the nonviolent offer.  This outcome is subgame imperfect because 
once the moderates have chosen the state the extremists only incentive to follow through 
on the threat is the desire to maintain its reputation.  While reputation is surely a factor in 
the extremists’ calculation, the extremists under these circumstances would prefer an 
outcome in which they could make a nonviolent offer that would be low enough to be 
rejected by the moderates thereby netting the extremists a payoff of qVe rather than qVe 
– cv.  To make the choice of nonviolent offer endogenous to the game will require 
changing the structure of the game such that the extremists choose between a violent 
threat (which must have a cost greater than zero if it is ineffective) and a nonviolent offer 
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ranging continuously between 0 and some upper bound.  In this way the outcome in 
which the extremists are forced to conduct costly and ineffective attacks against the 
moderates is eliminated except under incomplete information.   
The assumption of complete information is particularly problematic.  Although 
groups with a long history of violent interaction sharing a limited geographical area are 
probably relatively familiar with each others capabilities and preferences, it is certainly 
plausible that they might make miscalculations.   As an example of the importance of this 
assumption to the results, imagine a state that is uncertain of the value the extremists 
place on the moderates.  Such a state might make an offer that is doomed to fail if it 
underestimates that value or it might neglect to make an offer that would succeed if it 
overestimates that value.  Where the state makes an offer that is doomed to fail, the 
moderates will accept that offer initially if they expect to receive a valuable nonviolent 
offer from extremists uncertain of moderates’ value for remaining with the organization.  
In this example, adding uncertainty to the model produces a situation in which the 
moderates are able to play the state against the extremists and receive a greater utility 
than if the state had not made an offer.      
 Dropping the assumption of complete information generates a much more 
complicated game.  If I assume that the state and the extremists are uncertain of the 
moderates level of resolve in compromising with the state (which will be determined by 
the value of the Vm relative to the values of S, N and α), the state will be less certain of 
the utility of making an offer and the extremists will be less certain of the effectiveness 
any counteroffer will have.   
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In the game depicted in Figure 2, Nature determines the value (high, medium, or 
low) the moderates place on victory.  Uncertain of the level Nature has chosen, the state 
next decides whether to make an offer to the moderates.  If the state does not make an 
offer the game ends.  If the state makes an offer and the moderates are of the highest Vm 
type the offer will be rejected; if the moderates have a medium level of Vm they may 
accept or reject the offer; if they are of the lowest Vm type they will accept the state’s 
offer.   
Given that the moderates have accepted the offer from the state, the extremists 
know that they are not the highest Vm type, but remain uncertain whether they are of the 
middle or low type.  The extremists’ decision to make a particular counteroffer will be 
subject to error at this point.  If the extremists believe that the medium and low Vm types 
of moderates are equally likely, they will be more cautious about making violent threats 
that are costly if ineffective because if either type is equally likely the moderates are 
more likely to side with the state.  Alternatively, if the extremists believe that the 
moderates are more likely to be the medium Vm type they may be more likely to use a 
violent threat than a nonviolent offer because if the moderates are of the medium Vm 
type, rather than the low Vm type, they are more likely to side with the extremists 
regardless of the tactic the extremists choose.  If a threat is successful in reuniting the 
moderates with the extremists, it is costless; the same is not true of a nonviolent offer 
which is only costless when it is ineffective.  The extremists know that some higher Vm 
types of moderates may have an incentive to mimic the actions of the lower Vm types to 
gain the value of a nonviolent offer from the extremists.  In other words, some types of 
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 Figure 4: The Negotiation Game with Incomplete Information 
moderates, knowing they will side with the extremists in the end, may choose to initiate 
negotiations with the state in order to gain more power within the terrorist organization.   
Extremists who believe they are facing the higher Vm type of moderate will 
choose to make a violent threat so that they can keep the moderates on their side without 
paying the cost associated with a nonviolent offer.  If the extremists are incorrect in their 
belief that they are facing a higher Vm type of moderate who will be easily dissuaded 
from negotiations with the state, they may find themselves in the position of paying ex 
post for a threat that seemed costless ex ante and losing the moderates.
  
 
 
 
Violence Directed at Targets within the Opposition 
 The basic model and the extended version lead me to expect that, under some 
circumstances, the extremist faction within an opposition movement will respond to 
negotiations between the moderate faction of the same movement and the state by 
attacking the moderates.  This means that the increased violence that frequently 
accompanies peace settlements may not be directed at the state at all but is instead 
directed at the moderate opposition in an attempt to “spoil” negotiations.  Intuitively this 
result makes sense—under some circumstances the moderate opposition might be an 
easier target or the extremists might have reason to believe that the moderates can more 
easily be dissuaded from negotiating with the state than the state could be dissuaded from 
negotiating with the moderates.  Attacking opposition forces or leaders who negotiate 
with the state also has the added benefit for extremists of deterring future attempts at 
cooperation.  
 Below I discuss al-Qaeda as an extremist spoiler using violence to prevent Iraqi 
civilians from switching their allegiance to the United States intervention forces.  While 
this might currently be the most visible example of this sort of spoiling, other instances of 
extremist violence used to prevent moderates from negotiating abound—both within 
terrorist groups and within the parties to Civil Wars.  The beginning of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide in which extremist Hutus slaughtered moderate Hutus (thereby 
simultaneously eliminating powerful pro-peace actors and discouraging others from 
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taking a stand to advocate peace) as well as Tutsis demonstrates that this is not a tactic 
exclusive to what we commonly think of as terrorist organizations.  
Iraq 
 Recent attempts at negotiation between the United States and insurgents in Iraq 
have drawn the ire of al-Qaeda forces operating within the country.  As some groups of 
insurgents have begun to distance themselves from the violence of al-Qaeda and move 
towards cooperation with the United States, al-Qaeda violence towards these insurgent 
groups has increased.  On again, off again peace talks between the insurgents and the 
United States and Iraqi governments have provoked threats and attacks against moderate 
insurgents coming from both al-Qaeda and other extreme insurgent groups.   
In February 2006, peace talks between tribal leaders and American and Iraqi 
representatives reportedly led to the death of one Sunni participant.  The Sunday Times 
quoted the response of an al-Qaeda member from the slain leader’s tribe, “He was a 
traitor who deserved to be killed” (London, 5 February 2006).  In September of the same 
year the International Herald Tribune quoted a man who claimed to be a senior leader 
within al-Qaeda saying “We have the right to kill all infidels, like the police and army 
and all those who support them.  This tribal system is un-Islamic.  We are proud to kill 
tribal leaders who are helping the Americans” (18 September 2006).   
With the murder of Mejbil al-Sheik Isa and Damin al-Obeidi in July of 2005, 
extremists appeared to have made good on their threats to kill any Sunni Arabs who 
participated in the process of designing a new constitution for Iraq.  The New York Times 
reported this response to the killings from a Shiite member of the National Assembly, 
“This is the hand of terrorism, which does not want the country to move toward stability 
 29 
and to write the constitution in harmony with all Iraqis” (20 July 2005).  As negotiations 
with the government become more appealing to moderate insurgents and al-Qaeda 
supporters, hard line al-Qaeda members become more threatening in their relations with 
these moderates.
  
 
 
Bargaining with an Exit Option                                                                                    
 The negotiation game with incomplete information suggests that some types of 
moderates who have a lower value for victory against the state may agree to negotiate 
with the state but would also be willing to accept a non-violent offer of concessions from 
the extremists.  These moderates are playing the extremists and the state against each 
other to get the best deal—through initiating contact with the government they have 
signaled their willingness to use the exit option represented by the government.  As 
discussed earlier, if the extremists believe this signal to be credible and if they have a 
high enough value for the participation of the moderates in the opposition the extremists 
will make a nonviolent offer of concessions to the moderates. 
 This type of equilibrium is made more difficult to identify by the fact that it can 
be difficult to determine the motives of actors entering and leaving peace talks, 
particularly if those actors have an incentive (such as maintaining their credibility with 
the government so that they might maintain the exit option of negotiating with the 
government) to hide those motives.  It is also possible that this type of equilibrium might 
be less common if it is more costly for extremists to offer concessions (which, depending 
on the type of concession, might require greater fundraising and organizational ability 
than attacks which can be perpetrated by only a few individuals using relatively 
inexpensive supplies; alternatively concessions might require giving in to the moderates 
on ideological or tactical issues) than to wage attacks or if fear of extremist attacks is 
perceived to be a stronger motivator than concessions.  If it is true that concessions are 
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more costly and difficult than threats, their use might be expected only when the 
extremists control the majority of the organization’s resources or when extremists have 
the backing of a state sponsor willing to supply the resources necessary for concessions to 
moderates. 
 This type of spoiling behavior might also be less likely if extremists buy off 
moderates before they take the step of approaching the government (or responding to 
government approaches).  In such cases, because of the difficulty of observing the inner-
workings of a terrorist or other opposition network from the outside, it may be impossible 
to determine whether the moderates threatened exit and whether they would have been 
spoilers had they not been dissuaded in advance from engaging in peace talks.
  
 
 
Conclusion 
 By modeling the interaction between the moderate and extremist factions of a 
terrorist organization and the government in a strategic fashion it is possible to begin to 
understand when peace negotiations might succeed and when they might be accompanied 
by violence.  This model suggests conditions under which negotiations between the state 
and opposition moderates might occur and offers two explanations for the failure of such 
negotiations.  These two explanations are additional to those offered by the models of 
Kydd and Walter (2002), Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Bapat (2006), Bueno de Mesquita 
and Dickson (2007), and Arce and Sandler (2007). 
 More precisely the model provides a third explanation for the increase in violence 
that frequently accompanies peace processes.  Kydd and Walter (2002) modeled an 
increase in violence resulting from extremist spoiler violence against government-
friendly targets in an attempt to undermine government confidence in the moderates.  
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) modeled an increase in violence resulting from the exit of the 
moderates from the organization’s decision making process.  This analysis suggests that 
the increased violence might also be due to extremist attacks against moderates willing to 
negotiate with the government. 
 There is much work remaining to be done in this area of research.  This model 
suggests some directions in which future work might proceed.  The model here suggests 
new approaches to peace negotiations with terrorists that need to be explored more fully 
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to develop policies that will incorporate an understanding of the needs of moderates 
willing to abandon the tactics of terrorism.  
On a formal note, while I, like other scholars in the field, have disaggregated the 
terrorist organizations, the government continues to be considered as a unitary actor in 
most work on the subject, including this paper.  Future formal work might also consider 
further the implications of dropping or changing the assumptions that my model and 
those of others have relied upon, thereby increasing the reach of these models and 
approaching more useful conclusions.
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